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Abstract 
This paper measures both population ageing and shrinking within the working age populations of all 
27 European Union countries between 2010 and 2025, in the absence of any further migration. In this 
‘no migration scenario’ it provides the levels of net migration that should be necessary to maintain the 
size of the young working age population (aged 15-44 years of age). This paper does not give analytic 
focus to wider non-demographic processes that can either offset or amplify the ageing of skills. For 
example, neither the introduction of life-long learning programmes nor the postponements to the legal 
age of retirement are factored into the model. Results highlight that without migrants shows the 
employed population aged below 45 in all EU member states will have significant levels of shortfall in 
maintaining the size of the 2010 labour force. 
Keywords 
Labour Force, ageing, skills, migration. 
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I. Population ageing, skills ageing and migration 
Populations with below-replacement fertility and increased longevity are subjected to a process of 
shrinking and ageing. Shrinking refers to the declining size of the total population. Ageing can be 
defined in general terms as the “transformation of the age structure to relatively greater proportions in 
the older age groups” (UN 2001, p7). 1 It is usually measured as an increase in the old-age dependency 
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the age group 65 years and over, divided by the age group of 15-
64 years of age. Population ageing is recognised as a challenge to production and welfare systems 
when the population at working age decreases whilst population at retirement ages increase. 
There is, however, another and apparently overlooked aspect of ageing which is taking place within 
the working age population: there is a gradual shift from a younger to older manpower. As a result of 
this shift, there has been an elevation of the average duration of time elapsed since the termination of 
formal education, with this process translating into an increased prevalence of outdated knowledge 
among the working age population. We call this process the ‘ageing of skills’.  
For populations subjected to shrinking and ageing, immigration in the short and mid-term is the 
only way to offset negative demographic trends and replace missing natives. The notion of 
‘replacement migration’ was popularised in a much debated study published in 2001 by the United 
Nations, which addressed the following question: what level of international migration “would be 
needed to offset declines in the size of a population, and declines in the population of working age, as 
well as to offset the overall ageing of a population[?]” (p.7). The main problem with the UN study was 
its methodology based on the assumption that “after the immigrants arrive in a country, they 
experience the average fertility and mortality conditions of that country” (p.16). By submitting the 
immigrant population to the same demographic patterns as the receiving population, one will 
automatically produce the same demographic trends characterised by shrinking and ageing. If the 
objective is to prevent the ‘potential support ratio’ (PSR defined as “the ratio of the size of the 
population aged 15-64 to the size of the population aged 65 or over”) from declining below a given 
value considered to be critical (3.0), then a spiralling process is triggered. More and more migrants are 
called to offset demographic shrinking and ageing among the receiving population. Supplementary 
migrants will soon be needed in order to offset shrinking and ageing among migrants of former waves.  
One of the conclusions drawn by most scholars was that immigration cannot be a “solution” to 
ageing. Ageing is not a problem that would have a solution; instead it is a predicament to which there 
is no choice but to adapt
2
. Moreover, many scholars also argued that migration is only one among 
several possible responses such as: upwardly shifting the limit between supporting (active) and 
supported (retired) age groups (65 years of age in the UN model); increasing economic participation in 
working ages; increasing labour productivity; etc.  
                                                     
1
 United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? 
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The failure of the UN study to prove that migration could offset population ageing does not mean, 
however, that the notion of replacement migration, or amore fined tune conception of migration, must 
be abandoned. There are several aspects of demographic shrinking and ageing that immigration can 
contribute to curb, according to which type of migration is considered: permanent or temporary. 
Permanent migration tends to add to two demographic processes. First, to the working age 
population; because most migrants are within economic activity ages at the time of migration. Second, 
migrants add to overall demographic reproduction. Either because they migrate with their family or 
begin a family in the host country. But the population that permanent migration adds to is also subject 
to ageing. Hence there is a widely shared view that permanent migration can delay, but not sustainably 
curb, the decline of the potential support ratio. 
Temporary migration brings workers who will leave before, or at the end of, their working life. The 
size of the working age population increases whilst in the non-working ages there is little or no impact 
on overall demographic reproduction. In arithmetic terms, temporary migration can be adjusted in 
order to fill losses from population shrinking in working ages, without generating any further ageing.  
This paper measures ageing and population shrinking within the working age population that would 
occur in the European Union (EU27) and its member states between 2010 and 2025, in the absence of 
any further migration (a no migration scenario - no immigration and no emigration). This will be 
phrased as the ‘no migration scenario’. It then measures what migration should be necessary in order 
to reach the objective of maintaining the size of the young working age population (aged 15-44 years 
of age). This paper does not give analytic focus to non-demographic processes that can either offset or 
amplify the ageing of skills. Examples of the former include: the replacement of updated knowledge 
with professional experience or life-long learning programmes. For the latter, postponements of the 
legal age at retirement can exacerbate the ageing of skills, whilst it can be a response to a rising old-
age dependency. 
II. Methodology to assess the magnitude of the problem 
How will the employed population change between 2010 and 2025 in terms of size and distribution by 
age and occupation in the no-migration scenario? The methodology used to answer this question is 
described below. It must be noted that we must focus only on the employed population (the 
economically active population minus the proportion that are unemployed) since the unemployed are 
not distributed by occupation.  
2.1 General approach 
The projected distribution of the employed population by age and occupation depends upon three 
factors: 
(a) Projected distribution of the population by age (Demography); 
(b) Future age-specific rates of economic activity (employment); 
(c) Future distribution of the employed population by occupation and age (occupation). 
In order to isolate the impact of demography, a simplified approach consists in: (1) keeping the age-
specific rates of economic activity constant overtime. (2) Maintaining the distribution of the employed 
population by occupation to 2010 levels within any given group of generations (birth cohort). By 
doing so, we do not take into account three important factors of adjustment over time: (a) variations in 
economic participation; (b) changes in the occupational distribution at the entry into employment; (c) 
inter-occupation mobility. 
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2.2 Data 
(a) Population distribution by age (absolute numbers) with no migrants was provided by EUROSTAT 
population projections:  
P(x,2010) (observed number) 
P(x,2015); P(x,2020) and P(x,2025) (projected number)  
(b) Rates of economic activity: 
In 2010 w(x,2010) provided by the European Labour Force Survey. For subsequent years rates are 
assumed to remain constant at any given age x: 
w(x,2010) = w(x,2015) = w(x,2020) = w(x,2025) 
Active population distribution by age (absolute numbers) 
W(x,t) = P(x,t) . w(x,2010) for any year t from 2010 until 2025 
(c) Distribution of the employed population by occupation 
In 2010, provided by the LFS, in relative terms at age x: p(x,O,2010)  
 
∑ (        )   
 
 
For subsequent years - 2015, 2020 and 2025 - the proportional distribution of the employed 
population has been estimated as follows: 
For cohorts aged 25 and above in 2010, the distribution is assumed to remain unchanged by 
cohort. The absolute number of employed persons in occupation O at age x in years 2015, 2020 
and 2025 at age x (x ≥ 25) 
 
O(x+5,2015) = W(x+5,2015) . p(x,O,2010) 
O(x+10,2020) = W(x+10,2020) . p(x,O,2010) 
O(x+15,2025) = W(x+15,2025) . p(x,O,2010) 
 
For cohorts aged below 25 in 2010 (i.e. below 30 in 2015, below 35 in 2020, and below 40 in 2025), 
thze distribution is forecast from the above (in a function of Excel – below): 
 
FORECAST =     ̅ 
   ̅    ̅  
  
∑(   ̅)(   ̅)
∑(   ̅) 
 
 
Whereby x (age groups: 15-19,20-24, etc) and y (proportional values). 
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III. Findings 
The overall finding of the EU wide-projection (an aggregation of country-level projections of each 
member state) for all occupations in figure 1, highlights that between 2010 and 2025 the total labour 
force will decrease from 220,016,308 to 203,655,867 i.e. lose 7.44% of its initial value (in 2010). It is 
important to note that this will eventuate only if: (a) the rate of economic participation remains 
unchanged and (b) the EU neither receives nor sends any further migration after 2010. These 
simplifications are made with all subsequent results. Che population aged over 45 years of age remains 
fairly consistent with an increase of less than 6% in a 15 year period. Conversely, in the same time 
period, the population aged below 45 will decrease by over 16%. The absolute figures are highlighted 
within table 1. These findings highlight that the ageing of skills is a continual and on-going process for 
EU27 countries, which will be given further analytic focus in this paper.  
 
 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections with no migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en)  
 
 
Table 1 - Total Projections of the EU27 Labour Force by age, 2010-2025 in the 
no migration scenario (thousands) 
 
Age Group 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Below 45 131,245 123,559 116,039 109,751 
45 & Above 88,771 93,399 94,980 93,905 
Total 220,016 216,959 211,019 203,656 
Source: ibid.  
If active populations are disaggregated by occupation (1-digit ISCO code) then projections for all ages 
of the total EU labour force (figure 2) indicates that only technicians and professionals will see a rise 
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Fig.1: Projection of the EU27 Labour Force by age, 2010-2025 
in the no migration scenario 
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in employed persons in 2025. Whereas the remaining seven occupations will see a reduction in the 
absolute number of employed persons. Although the number of clerks and service workers looks set to 
remain around only slightly lower than the figure in 2010.  
 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections without migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en) and the European 
Labour Force Survey. 
As highlighted in figure 1 there will be a significant reduction of the below 45 age group. The 
remainder of the analysis will give focus to this group as the future of the economy of both European 
member states and Europe as a whole are heavily reliant upon the ‘young workforce’. Furthermore 
young highly skilled migrants are more likely to spur innovation and create a positive economic 
impact in a given country (Venturini, 2012)
3
. Figure 3 shows an arresting and consistent trend for all 
EU member states, namely an overall reduction for the labour force aged below 45 in the absence 
of migration after 2010. Countries that are less affected by this trend are France and Cyprus, which 
manage to have a relative reduction of less than 10%. Mediterranean countries (i.e. Italy and Spain) on 
the other hand are likely to experience a nearly 30% reduction in the working age population aged 
below 45, in the space of 15 years. These future patterns are likely to have significant impacts upon 
every economy in the EU, as well as Europe as a whole. 
                                                     
3
 2012, Innovation and Migration with F.Montobbio, C. Fassio, MPC Analytical Note, 2012/05. 
(http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2008.pdf) 
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Fig.2: Projections of the Total Employed Population by Occupation, 
2010-2025 in the no migration scenario 
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Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections without migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en)  
Even though all countries will see a decline in the labour force aged below 45, figure 4 highlights that 
not all occupations in the EU will see a sizeable decline. In fact some occupations will see increases or 
a continuation in the employed population i.e. professionals and technicians. However, figure 4 makes 
it very clear that most professions will experience decline in the employed workforce. Groups of 
occupations such as legislators, elementary and agricultural workers will face the most critical 
population shrinking and ageing of skills. The impact upon the future productive capacity of each 
industry that these occupations provide labour will clearly significant and undesirable. 
 
 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections without migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en) and the European 
Labour Force Survey. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the relative change, for each EU country, of the working population aged below 
45 and 45 and above (respectively) from 2010 to 2025. Each country has been ranked based on their 
relative share in 2025 in comparison to 2010. Countries such as France and the UK have a more 
positive demographic outlook than in comparison to the likes of Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
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Fig.3: Projection of the employed population aged below 45 by 
Member State, 2010-2025, in the no migration scenario 
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Fig.4: Projections of the EU27 Employed Population 
aged below 45 by Occupation, 2010-2025  
in the no migration scenario 
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Table 2 - Relative Change to Labour Force Aged Below 45 by EU country, 2010-2025 
Baseline 100 in 2010 for each country 
Above Average Below Average 
Country 2010 2015 2020 2025 Country 2010 2015 2020 2025 
France 100 97 95 95 EU Average 100 94 88 84 
Cyprus 100 102 99 93 Luxembourg 100 93 87 83 
Poland 100 96 93 92 Austria 100 92 87 83 
Lithuania 100 100 97 92 Bulgaria 100 98 91 82 
Denmark 100 96 93 92 Germany 100 90 86 82 
Sweden 100 97 93 92 Romania 100 96 90 82 
UK 100 96 93 91 Hungary 100 98 92 81 
Malta 100 101 98 91 Portugal 100 94 86 78 
Netherlands 100 95 92 91 Czech Republic 100 99 90 78 
Ireland 100 97 94 90 Slovenia 100 94 86 77 
Belgium 100 95 92 89 Greece 100 92 83 75 
Estonia 100 96 91 87 Italy 100 90 80 72 
Slovakia 100 101 96 86 Spain 100 92 81 71 
Latvia 100 99 92 85 
      
Table 3 - Relative Change to Labour Force Aged 45 & Above by EU country, 2010-2025 
Baseline 100 in 2010 for each country 
Above Average Below Average 
Country 2010 2015 2020 2025 Country 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Ireland 100 109 118 129 EU Average 100 105 107 106 
Spain 100 110 120 127 Sweden 100 102 104 103 
Romania 100 106 110 117 Denmark 100 103 104 102 
Cyprus 100 104 108 113 Slovenia 100 101 100 102 
Portugal 100 104 109 113 Austria 100 109 109 101 
Czech Republic 100 97 103 113 Germany 100 107 106 100 
Greece 100 106 111 113 Bulgaria 100 97 98 100 
Italy 100 108 113 108 Netherlands 100 104 105 99 
Poland 100 106 110 108 Lithuania 100 103 103 98 
Hungary 100 95 98 108 Estonia 100 97 97 98 
Luxembourg 100 110 111 108 Latvia 100 100 99 97 
Slovakia 100 97 98 106 France 100 101 101 97 
UK 100 106 108 106 Belgium 100 102 92 96 
     Malta 100 94 90 93 
Source for both tables: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections without migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en) and the European 
Labour Force Survey. 
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In order to further illustrate population shrinking and the ageing of skills within European member 
states analysis will be specific to three European Member states, Germany, France and Spain. 
Germany’s trends in the employed population below 45 years of age are similar to the overall EU27 
average in figure 3. Conversely France and Spain have markedly different trends to the EU27 average. 
Whereas France will experience a 10% reduction in the employed population aged below45 (lower 
than the EU27 average), on the other hand Spain will have an almost 30% reduction in their labour 
force (higher than the EU27 average).  
Figure 5A shows that in Germany a significant gap opens between the employed labour force aged 
below 45 and those aged 45 and above. Whereas France (figure 5B) has a more positive demographic 
picture in figure 5B, with the population aged below 45 remaining higher than the workforce aged 45 
and over. Spain on the other hand (figure 5C) has a more dramatic trajectory, with the two age groups 
almost being equal by the end of the projection period (2025). Although the demographic momentum 
in each country will see a reduction in their respective populations, the impacts will be significantly 
felt more in Spain than in France, especially in the ageing of skills. 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections without migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zmp&lang=en)  
To further illustrate the impact of the ageing upon skills specific occupations (2-digit ISCO code) have 
been selected. Although the wider findings (Figure 5) highlight that the employed population in all 
countries are ageing, it is also important to note that the impact of ageing is diverse by occupation and 
country. Yet, analysing these patterns on a finer scale into more specific professions, the impact of 
demography combines with other strong factors of change that also affect the number of employed 
persons in a given profession. On the supply side, there are rising levels of education, which are also 
subject to changing patterns of study. Hence each industry is susceptible to change with patterns in 
education, including those that do not require higher qualifications. From a demand and supply side 
there are also issues of inter-occupational mobility i.e. person moving from one occupation to another. 
Unfortunately there has been no systematic study that provides pan-EU27 data to highlight patterns of 
change. Hence the projected results in figures 8 to 10 do not account for such changes. 
Figure 8 highlights that there will be an increased supply of engineers aged below 45. Yet the 
available supply without migrants highlights that Germany and especially France will have 
significantly more supply in relative terms. 
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Fig. 5: Projections of Selected Countries Labour Forces by age, 2010-2025 in the no 
migration scenario 
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Health professionals (see figure 9) are another occupation that require high levels of education. 
However France is the only country projected to have an increased supply of person aged below 45 in 
2025, with Germany having a very small reduction, whilst Spain is likely to experience a significant 
decline in supply. 
 
 
 
In more elementary occupations the demographic effects of ageing are also clear. For example in 
figure 10 reductions are experienced in all three countries. However France continues to have the 
highest relative share of stationary plant and related operators.  
 
 
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
2010 2015 2020 2025
B
as
el
in
e 
 1
0
0
 in
 2
0
1
0
 
Fig.8: Population projections of  Physical, Mathematical and 
Engineering Science Professionals aged below 45, 2010-2025, in the no 
migration scenario in France, Germany & Spain 
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Fig.9: Population projections of Life Science & Health Professionals 
aged below 45, 2010-2025, in the no migration scenario in France, 
Germany & Spain 
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Fig.10: Population projections of  Stationary plant and related 
operators  aged below 45, 2010-2025, in the no migration scenario in 
France, Germany & Spain 
France
Germany
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The impacts of both the ageing of skills and shrinking of populations in EU27 countries are therefore 
diverse. Although the results are contingent upon levels of inter-occupational activity, levels of 
education, the rate of unemployment, the changing structure of demand, the results from figure 3 are 
startling, which provides all EU27 countries with a demographic predicament will eventuate in the 
medium-term, rather than the long-term. 
IV. Conclusion 
There are a variety of policy responses that can help to mitigate future demographic impacts upon the 
employed workforces of EU27 countries. In order to accurately assess the required magnitude of 
policy responses, an over-simplified, but quantifiable, objective could be to maintain the current levels 
of employed persons aged below45 for each EU27 member state. 
Table 4 –Number of additional workers needed to maintain 
employment at its 2010 level in the EU and EU27 below 45 years of age  
 
Age Group 
Required Number of 
additional workers 
Percentage of 2025  
Employed Population 
EU Average 21,493,724 10.55% 
Spain 4,347,048 20.80% 
Germany 4,157,436 10.12% 
Italy 3,575,447 20.52% 
UK 1,621,584 5.31% 
Romania 1,188,527 12.67% 
France 914,132 3.37% 
Greece 801,085 17.99% 
Portugal 714,005 13.82% 
Czech Republic 710,735 14.75% 
Hungary 501,642 12.95% 
Netherlands 486,003 5.90% 
Austria 466,782 12.15% 
Bulgaria 363,858 12.07% 
Belgium 338,045 7.52% 
Sweden 240,328 5.02% 
Slovakia 235,080 9.28% 
Slovenia 145,726 16.15% 
Denmark 143,698 5.13% 
Ireland 141,019 6.41% 
Latvia 106,495 10.26% 
Poland 102,867 5.01% 
Lithuania 77,009 4.98% 
Estonia 63,098 10.07% 
Luxembourg 24,736 12.59% 
Cyprus 16,543 3.99% 
Malta 10,796 6.85% 
Ageing of skills and complementary immigration in the EU, 2010-2025 
11 
Clearly the implications of an ageing workforce will have sweeping effects across many of the EU27 
countries. Spain, Greece and Italy are very prescient examples of countries that require significant 
policies to cope with such changes. One method may be to increase economic participation, especially 
of women. However their impacts will not be sufficient, given the magnitude of this issue. For 
example, the EU may require over 21 million new workers in 2025, this cannot be solely alleviated by 
increases in female economic participation. Another potential factor is to increase the levels of 
occupational mobility in countries that are experiencing imbalances by occupation; however such 
structural changes may take some time to implement and would not meet quantitatively the needs of 
table 4. Complementary immigration is another option. Based on these research findings, it is clear 
that migration that directly complements the requirements of EU member states will become central to 
fulfilling the demands of their respective job markets. 
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V. Appendix 
EUROSTAT also provides projections with migrants. Results with migrants are given, using exactly 
the same methodology as section 2, which can be compared to figure 3. By comparing the two figures 
migrants have a significant and positive impact on the number of employed persons aged below 45 by 
member state.  
However, there are problems with the assumptions made with migrants in the EUROSTAT 
projections
4
. One issue is what the assumptions actually are – where have they been derived from? The 
meta-data notes do not give any apt description or links to ascertain what the assumptions are. Hence 
the migration scenario has not been included in the main body of analysis. 
 
 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat population projections with migration 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150p&lang=en) 
  
                                                     
4
 EUROSTAT migration assumptions can be accessed here: 
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_10c2150zma&lang=en  
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Fig.11: Projection of the employed population aged below 45 by 
Member State, 2010-2025, in the migration scenario 
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